



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The German Tribune

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

Hamburg, 12 April 1973
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Nixon plans to remain in Europe despite difficulties

DIE WELT

President Nixon's warning to the American people that the international position of the United States is in danger of being undermined by domestic price increases and the resulting budget deficit amply demonstrates the tough spot America is in in the era of negotiations.

The President also made it clear that if America is to meet its overseas commitments and maintain the strategic balance with the Soviet Union either taxes must be increased or government expenditure cut.

So it is that the latter-day Athens is suffering from a bout of domestic weakness in relation to the latter-day Sparta, though its overall wealth and power remain superior to those of the poorer rival.

The paradox is complete when one realises that the administration has no

At the same time, though, the US government justified its concession to the Soviet Union on the ground that the numerical superiority in offensive missiles conceded to Moscow represented no more than a marginal advantage of no strategic significance.

This argument has since been wielded by Congressional opponents of the President's defence policies and other public critics on behalf of further cuts in American armament and military expenditure.

The critics maintain that cuts of this kind would only marginally affect US deterrent potential, that is to say its growth rather than the hard core.

Mr Nixon's dramatic warning not to reduce US troop strength and strategic aims in general and against cuts in US military presence in Europe in particular bears witness both for America's allies and the Soviet Union to the shortage of time that has long beset Washington in respect of the various negotiations in Geneva and Vienna.

Of late the US government has neglected to outline to its Nato partners in Europe its targets in the European troop cut talks. This offhand approach has given rise to the impression that Washington would prefer not to be committed to a joint policy that would encroach on its leeway in talks with the Soviet Union.



President Ortolí in Bonn

President of the European Community Commission, François Xavier Ortolí, called on Chancellor Brandt in Bonn on 29 March. President Ortolí had previously met Foreign Minister Walter Scheel to discuss what measures could be taken to improve cooperation between the nine EEC members. The main topic for discussion was how political union could be brought about. At the Paris summit conference last October it was hoped that this union could be achieved by 1980.

The impression conveyed is that the United States might prefer to limit the MBFR agreement to bilateral US and Soviet troop withdrawals from Germany. The haste with which the US delegation in Vienna pressed for agreement on procedure in preparation for the start of talks proper would seem to indicate that Washington might prefer to be able to

produce an international agreement as soon as possible.

This agreement would serve as the basis for US troop cuts as a contribution toward détente and the consolidation of the balance of military power in Europe at a reduced level and at the same time represent a bulwark of international commitments to ward off further pressure in Congress for troop withdrawals.

President Nixon's declaration that US forces in Europe will not and must not be unilaterally reduced if the defence potential of the Nato alliance is to be maintained and the opportunity of pressing home an advantage in security talks to be exploited bears out the conclusions that have been reached in Europe of late with regard to the serious problems that the US administration faces.

Lothar Rühl
(Die Welt, 31 March 1973)

All is well between Bonn and USA, says Helmut Schmidt

Relations between this country and the United States remain cordial, Bonn Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt commented after lengthy discussions with US Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger in Washington.

"There are no difficulties," Helmut Schmidt noted. "This," he continued, "is why we have no need of summit talks." The Minister stressed the need to keep ties in trim. Bilateral relations between Washington and Bonn will continue to be of major significance in Atlantic affairs even though this country may increasingly join in an integrated Common Market foreign policy approach.

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 29 March 1973)

Nixon's MBFR semantics

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

In his speech marking the end of America's military commitments in Vietnam President Nixon gave a renewed assurance that the United States will not be unilaterally cutting its troop strength in Europe.

Here in Europe, where the great powers face one another directly, Mr Nixon thus sees no prospect of compelling the other side, by means of unilateral moves, to follow suit.

In Europe, he feels, agreements must be concluded that oblige all concerned to reduce their military commitments in a balanced manner. Europe is too important to be left to the Europeans themselves.

One can but hope that this statement will have put a damper on US domestic debate favouring unilateral troop cuts in Europe on the ground that the countries of Europe would then just have to increase their own defence contribution.

This argument overlooks the fact that the extent of America's contribution towards the defence of Europe is more than a matter of mere manpower. It also represents a guarantee of the efficacy of the nuclear deterrent that Western

Europe does not and is not intended to have at its own disposal.

What is more, a unilateral move by the United States at a time when détente is in the news would not be considered an incentive to Europe to increase its own defence commitments. It is more likely to be viewed as an indication that Europe too can buck its defence obligations, the argument being that the United States evidently considers the general danger-level to be low.

One point in Mr Nixon's address is however, worthy of note. In the context of the Vienna MBFR talks he no longer mentioned balanced cuts but merely mutual troop reductions.

So far the Soviet Union has been alone in disregarding the concept of balance. Does this mean that, to begin with, the United States would now be satisfied with a mutual percentage reduction in the number of foreign troops stationed in Europe, primarily US and Soviet forces, that is?

This would be an alarming development. Within the framework of the Western alliance this would be tantamount to a unilateral American move and automatically lead, no doubt, to corresponding moves by America's partners in Western Europe. As a result there would be no further pressure on the East to continue with the negotiations.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 31 March 1973)

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option but to preclude the possibility of cuts in defence expenditure in order to ensure that the United States is able to maintain its negotiating position with regard to the Soviet Union.

Mr Nixon's reference to the logic behind MBFR negotiating tactics and the MBFR talks lays bare the dilemma a country can see when bargaining with an international political opponent over a balanced cut in military commitments in the expectation of domestic difficulties being alleviated by means of international agreement with the other side.

In outlining its reasons for concluding last year's Moscow Salt agreements Washington noted on the one hand the necessity of implementing the US strategic arms programme and rejected the idea of unilateral arms limitations.

